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NOTES
NOTES
TAXABILITY BY THE ISSUING GOVERNMENT OF BONDS
WITH TAX-EXEMPTION FEATURES
Exemption from taxation of state and national government
securities in the United States rests upon two general bases.
The first is the constitutional basis established as a result of
MeCullock v. Maryland., In that case, the United States Supreme
Court through Chief Justice Marshall laid down the doctrine that
the Constitution of the United States impliedly prohibits taxa-
tion by the states of instrumentalities of the federal government.
Later cases sustained the doctrine as applied to taxation by the
federal government of instrumentalities of the states.2 That this
doctrine extends to exempt bonds of the federal government and
its agencies from state taxation 3 and to exempt the bonds of the
several states and their instrumentalities from taxation by the
federal government4 is firmly established. This form of exemp-
tion has often been criticized. 5 Constitutional amendments have
been proposed for its abolition. 6 To date none of them has been
successful. The second basis of exemption is what might be de-
scribed as one of local policy. This is the basis on which secur-
ities issued by either branch of the government are exempt from
taxation by the branch issuing them. This type of exemption
is sometimes expressly stated in state constitutions 7 or implied
1. (1819) 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579.
2. Collector v. Day (1871) 11 Wall. 113; 20 L. ed. 122. Indian Motor-
cycle Co. v. United States (1931) 283 U. S. 570, 51 S. Ct. 601, 75 L. ed.
1277.
3. Weston et al. v. City of Charleston (1829) 2 Pet. 449, 7 L. ed. 481;
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin (1927) 275 U. S. 136,
48 S. Ct. 55; 72 L. ed. 202.
4. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. (1895) 157 U. S. 429, 15 S. Ct.
673, 39 L. ed. 759.
5. Twentieth Century Fund, Inc., Facing the Tax Problem, (1937) p.
303; Martin, The Social Aspects of Tax Exemption (1936) 183 Annals of
the American Academy 48; Withers, The Menace of Tax-Exempt Bonds
(1935) 141 The Nation 241; Lozier, The Policy of Exempting Government
Bonds from Their Just Share of Tax Burdens Is Un-Democratic, Un-
Republican, Un-American and a Vicious Form of Governmental Favoritism(1934) 78 Cong. Record 10738.
6. Proposed House Joint Res. 175 (1933) 77 Cong. Rec. 2960; Proposed
Senate Joint Resolution 68 (1934) 78 Cong. Rec. 69; Proposed House Joint
Resolution 219 (1934) 78 Cong. Rec. 168; Proposed Senate Joint Resolution
150 (1935) 79 Cong. Rec. 9743; New York Times, June 20, 1935, p. 2: 5.
7. See, e. g., Va. Const., art. XIII, sec. 183.
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therefrom.8 In the case of securities of the federal government
and more often in the case of state securities, the exemption is
found in a general statute9 or in a specific statute under which
particular securities were issued. 0 The purpose behind such
exemptions is that of facilitating the borrowing process by mak-
ing the purchase of the bonds more attractive to the potential
investor,," with a corollary purpose of enabling the state to bor-
row money at a lower rate of interest by virtue of the tax-
exemption feature. 12 That this second purpose is best accomp-
lished in this manner is somewhat doubtful in view of the con-
sequent loss in taxes to the issuing government.13 This type of
exemption has been attacked because of its effect of nullifying,
at least in part, the purpose of progressive income tax rates,"
and because of the advantage afforded by it to the wealthy tax-
payer at the expense of the taxpayer of small or moderate
means. 5 It is proposed here to discuss some of the problems
which would be involved under the United States Constitution
in an attempt on the part of the United States or the state
governments to abolish this second type of exemption, that is,
exemption by the issuing government. No attempt will be made
to treat the inter-governmental exemption based upon McCulloch
v. Maryland."6
I
Insofar as obligations of the states are concerned, two provi-
sions of the United States Constitution would be involved in an
attempt on the part of a state to abrogate the exemption from
taxation extended to outstanding bonds, namely, the "contract"
8. Droll v. Furnas Co. (1922) 108 Nebr. 85, 187 N. W. 876, 26 A. L. R.
543. Additional cases holding to same effect are cited in Note (1923) 26
A. L. R. 547, 552.
9. See, e. g., Tenn. Code (1932) secs. 1086-1088.
10. See, e. g., Iowa Code (1935) sec. 6944, subdiv. 22 (Exemptions of
State Soldiers' Bonus Bonds); Federal Farm Mortgage Corp. Act (1934) 48
Stat. 349, 369, (1934) 12 U. S. C. A. sec. 1020 (f) (Exemption of Federal
Farm Mortgage Corporation Bonds).
11. Shoup, Tax Exemption (1934) 14 Encyc. of Social Sciences 528, 529;
Rowe, The Burden of Tax Exemption of Government Bonds (1926) 16
American Economic Review 653.
12. Martin, op. cit. supra, note 5. See also articles cited supra, note 11.
13. Hinrichs, The Cost of Tax-Exempt Securities (1926) 41 Pol. Sci.
Quar. 271; Shoup, op. cit. supra, note 11; Martin, op. cit. supra, note 5.
14. Twentieth Century Fund, Inc., op. cit. supra, note 5; Shoup, op. cit.
supra, note 11.
15. Shoup, op. cit. supra, note 11; Rowe, op. cit. supra, note 11.
16. (1819) 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579. Lowndes, Taxing the Income from
Tax-Exempt Securities (1938) 32 Ill. L. Rev. 643 contains an exhaustive
discussion of this phase of the problem.
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clause17 and the "due process" clause.18 The former would be
the more important provision in this matter. The due process
clause would probably offer no more protection than the contract
clause insofar as this question is concerned.-
The "contract" clause provides that "no state*** shall ***
pass any * * * law impairing the obligation of contracts. '20 Be-
fore the Fourteenth Amendment this provision was the most
important single restraint in the Constitution upon state power21
insofar as the number of cases before the United States Supreme
Court was concerned. Although its importance has been over-
shadowed in recent years by the Fourteenth Amendment, it still
occupies an important position as a curb upon state action. 22
Notwithstanding its importance, little is known of the actual
purpose of the framers in placing it in the Constitution or of
the field which they intended it to cover.2 3 The reports of the
debate in the convention throw little light upon the matter.24 In
the Federalist Hamilton spoke of it as designed to prevent hos-
tility among the states arising from their "atrocious breaches of
moral obligation and social justice, ' 25 and Madison declared
that "laws impairing the obligation of contracts are contrary to
the first principles of the social compact and to every principle
of sound justice" and that the provision was adopted as a result
of a demand of the people for reforms which would "banish
speculation on public measures, inspire a general prudence and
industry, and give a regular course of the business of society. '26
These declaration throw but little light upon the scope of the
field in which the framers intended the clause to operate.
Although little is known of the actual purpose and intent of
the framers, the conditions which probably caused the insertion
17. United States Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 10.
18. United States Constitution, Amendment XIV.
19. See discussion infra as to effect of the "due process" clause of the
Fifth Amendment as applied to congressional action.
20. United States Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 10.
21. See Murray v. Charleston (1878) 96 U. S. 432, 448, 24 L. ed. 760.
22. Ibid.
23. "It is remarkable that the very important clause was passed over
almost without comment during the discussion preceding the adoption of
that instrument, though since its adoption, no clause which the Constitution
contains has been more prolific of litigation, or given rise to more animated
and at times angry controversy." Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th
ed. 1927) 554.
24. 2 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention (1937) 439; 5
Elliot's Debates (1863) 485. See Johnson, The Contract Clause of the
United States Constitution (1928) 16 Ky. L. J. 222.
25. The Federalist, No. 7.
26. Ibid. No. 44.
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of the clause and to which Hamilton and Madison referred are
well-known.2 7 Following the Revolutionary War, the plight of
debtors had become drastic. To alleviate conditions, state legis-
latures had passed numerous "stay laws" intended for the relief
of debtors. The general purpose of such laws was to postpone
the payment of debts or in some cases even to wipe them out
completely. Widespread retaliation had sprung up among the
states. No creditor could be sure what the obligations owed him
would be worth a day in advance, or when he could expect to
collect them. Mr. Justice Sutherland, dissenting in the Minnesota
Mortgage Moratorium Case,28 declared that the clause was
"meant to foreclose state action impairing the obligation of con-
tracts primarily and especially in respect of * * * action aimed
at giving relief to debtors in ease of emergency.' ' 20 Historical
considerations lend ample support to this view.80
Whether or not the framers of the constitution intended the
clause to apply to contracts entered into by the state is not
known.2 1 That they did not expect that it would some day be
applied to contracts made by the states with regard to taxation
seems highly probable. Writing in the Federalist, Hamilton de-
clared that, except for duties on imports, the states retained
absolute and unqualified power and authority in raising their
own revenue and that any attempt on the part of the national
government to abridge them in the exercise of this power would
be "a violent assumption of power, unwarranted by any article
or clause of its constitution. ' 32 This statement soon proved to
be erroneous. 33
Whatever the intent of the framers 34 as to the application of
27. Bancroft, History of the Formation of the Constitution of the United
States (1882) 228 et seq.; Warren, The Making of the Constitution (1928)
5, 553; Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United
States (1913) 31; Madison, Preface to Debates in the Convention of 1787, in
3 Farrand, op. cit. supra, note 24 at 539, 584.
28. Home Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdel (1934) 290 U. S. 398, 54
S. Ct. 231, 78 L. ed. 413.
29. See 290 U. S. at 465; see also Edwards v. Kearzey (1878) 95 U. S.
595, 24 L. ed. 793.
30. Supra, note 27.
31. W. R. Davis, who was a member of the Convention, declared in the
debates in the North Carolina Convention that the clause refers merely to
contracts between individuals and did not give the federal government any
power to interfere with state securities. 3 Farrand, op. cit. supra, note 24
at 349.
32. The Federalist, No. 32.
33. McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579.
34. The intent of the framers would not, in any event, have been con-
trolling in the applications of the clause. Cf. dissent of Mr. Justice Black
in Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson (1938) 58 S. Ct. 436,
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the clause to state obligations, in 1810 in the case of Fletcher
t,. Peck 5 the Supreme Court held that it applied to contracts
to which a state was a party. Two years later the court held that
a contract by a state contained in a grant of land by it, exempt-
ing the land from taxation, was included within the prohibition
of the clause.6 No consideration was given to the special nature
of the subject of the contract, that is, the power of taxation.
In 1819 the Dartmouth College Case3 7 decided that a corporate
charter granted by a state, when accepted and acted upon by
the corporation, became a contract which the state could not
alter by virtue of the prohibition of the contract clause. The
decision opened a wide field for contractural exemptions from
taxation. Thereafter provisions granting exemption from taxa-
tion were frequently inserted in corporate charters. In 1830 the
Supreme Court held that a mere grant of charter constituted
no implied exemption from taxation. 38 Marshall, in a dictum,
reaffirmed in negative language that a state could contract
away its power of taxation, but added that abandonment of the
power should never be presumed.3 9 Soon the court began to
apply to corporate charters the doctrine of strict construction
against the grantee under a public grant,40 which shortly be-
came important in construing grants of exemption from taxation
contained in corporate charters.41
In 1853 the exact question of whether a contract, the subject
matter of which was the method and amount of taxation which
might be imposed by a state, was within the contract clause was
for the first time directly presented to the Supreme Court. Ohio
had chartered a state bank by a statute providing that the bank
should pay the state a specified portion of its earnings in lieu
of all other taxes. A subsequent statute taxing the bank the
same as all other property was attacked as invalid under the
contract clause; but acceptance of the charter by the bank and
440, 82 L. ed. (adv. op.) 457, 462 as to effect which intent of framers and
historical consideration have had upon the scope of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as construed by the court.
35. (1810) 6 Cranch 87, 3 L. ed. 162. This is the first case in which the
United States Supreme Court held a state law void because it conflicted
with the United States Constitution.
36. New Jersey v. Wilson (1812) 7 Cranch 164, 3 L. ed. 303.
37. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819) 4 Wheat. 518,
4 L. ed. 629.
38. The Providence Bank v. Billings (1830) 4 Pet. 514, 7 L. ed. 939.
39. See 4 Pet. at 561.
40. Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren
Bridge (1837) 11 Pet. 420, 9 L. ed. 773.
41. See cases infra, notes 77 and 78.
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payment of the specified sum were held to constitute a contract
binding upon the state.42 In the opinion of the court, the power
of taxation could properly be made the subject of a contract by
the state, which, by contracting against taxation, did not contract
away any part of its sovereign power to choose the subjects of
taxation but merely exercised that power. Dissenting opinions
urged that the power of taxation was a part of the state's sover-
eign power, which could not be made the subject of a contract
so as to be vested in an irrepealable charter of a corporation and
placed beyond the reach of future legislatures. 3 Subsequent
cases adhered, although somewhat grudgingly at times, 44 to the
majority position.45 Attempts to overthrow it have failed., The
only inroads upon it have been by virtue of the doctrine of strict
construction; the principle itself still stands. The wisdom of
placing the power of taxation in a category separate and apart
from the power of eminent domain and the police power, insofar
as the power of a state to contract with respect thereto is con-
cerned, is doubtful. Contracts by which a state undertakes not
to exercise the latter two powers relate, it is held, to such an
attribute of sovereignty that a state may not contract against
their exercise.47 The power of taxation seems as much an attri-
bute of sovereignty as the power of eminent domain and the
police power, and its exercise as necessary to the continued exist-
ence of the state as the other two.
Whatever the soundness of the rule, its existence when the
property involved in the exemption contract is bonds issued
by a state or municipality"8 is clear.49 Difficult problems may
42. The Piqua Branch of the State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop (1853) 16
How. 369, 14 L. ed. 977. See Zumbalen, The Federal Constitution and Con-
tract Exemption from Taxation (1932) 17 ST. Louis LAW Rsvisw 191, for a
discussion of the Supreme Court decisions in the matter.
43. See 16 How. at 393.
44. "The power of taxation is an attribute of sovereignty, and is essen-
tial to every independent government. If the point were not already ad-
judged, it would admit of grave consideration, whether the legislature of
a state can surrender their power, and make its action in this respect
binding upon its successors, any more than it can surrender its police power
or its power of eminent domain." Mr. Justice Field in Minot v. Philadelphia,
etc. R. Co. (1874) 18 Wall. 206, 226, 21 L. ed. 888.
45. Dodge v. Woolsey (1856) 18 How. 331, 15 L. ed. 401; Wright v.
Louisville and Nashville R. Co. (1915) 236 U. S. 687, 35 S. Ct. 475, 59
L. ed. 788.
46. Washington University v. Rouse (1869) 8 Wall. 439, 19 L. ed. 498;
see dissent of Mr. Justice Miller, 8 Wall. at 443.
47. West River Bridge v. Dix (1848) 6 How. 507, 12 L. ed. 535; Penn-
sylvania Hospital v. Philadelphia (1917) 245 U. S. 20, 38 S. Ct. 35, 62 L. ed.
124; Stone v. Mississippi (1880) 101 U. S. 814, 18 L. ed. 403.
48. The contract clause applies to contracts entered into by municipal-
ities with state authority. United States ex rel. Hoffman v. Quincy (1867)
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of course arise in application. Such are the problems, first, of
whether or not there is any contract at all and, second, as to
the scope of the exemption contained in the contract.
Obviously, if there be no contract, there can be no impairment
of its obligation. Determining when a contract effecting an
exemption from taxation exists may not always be simple. The
word "contracts" in the constitutional provision "is used in its
usual or popular sense as signifying an agreement of two or
more minds, upon sufficient consideration, to do or not to do
certain acts. Mutual assent, expressed or implied, to its terms
is of its very essence." 50 The presence of assent to exempt bonds
from taxation and of consideration must be determined upon
inspection of the constitution and general laws of the state with
regard to taxation and of the statute under which the specific
bonds were issued. When there is no express exemption, the
rule is the same as that applied where a corporate charter
granted by the state contains no express exemption from taxa-
tion,51 that is, that no implied agreement to grant any exemption
will be recognized. 52 Some courts have questioned this view
on the ground that any attempt of a state or a municipality to
tax its obligations is inconsistent with the obligation assumed ;"
and several state courts have held, as a matter of local statutory
construction rather than of constitutional law, that in the
absence of any intent of the state legislature expressed in
the statutes to tax the state's bonds the presumption is that
they were intended to be exempt.54 Others take a contrary posi-
4 Wall. 535, 18 L. ed. 403; Murray v. City Council of Charleston (1878)
96 U. S. 432, 24 L. ed. 760. Likewise, a city ordinance passed in pursuance
of authority granted by the state is a law within the meaning of the con-
tract clause. Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Minnesota (1908) 208 U. S. 583, 28
S. Ct. 341, 52 L. ed. 630.
49. Orr v. Gilman (1902) 183 U. S. 278, 22 S. Ct. 213, 46 L. ed. 196;
Hale v. Iowa State Board of Assessment and Review (1937) 302 U. S.
(adv. op.) 95, 58 S. Ct. (adv. op.) 102, 82 L. ed. (adv. op.) 66. Tax exemp-
tion clauses have no extraterritorial effect. Therefore when tax-exempt
state bonds acquire a situs in a state other than that of issue, the state of
situs is not precluded by the contract clause from levying a tax upon the
bonds. Appeal Tax Court of Baltimore v. Patterson (1878) 50 Md. 354.
50. Crane v. Hahlo (1922) 258 U. S. 142, 146, 42 St. Ct. 214, 66 L. ed.
514; Louisiana v. New Orleans (1883) 109 U. S. 285, 288, 3 S. Ct. 211, 27
L. ed. 936.
51. The Providence Bank v. Billings (1830) 4 Pet. 514, 7 L. ed. 939.
52. See Murray v. City Council of Charleston (1878) 96 U. S. 432, 24
L. ed. 760.
53. See Hartman v. Greenhow (1881) 102 U. S. 672, 683, 26 L. ed. 271.
Mayor of Macon v. Jones (1881) 67 Ga. 489; State ex rel. Louisiana Im-
provement Co. v. Board of Assessors (1902) 111 La. 986, 36 So. 91.
54. Penick v. Foster (1907) 129 Ga. 217, 58 S. E. 776, 12 Ann. Cas. 346;
State ex rel. Du Parte v. Board of Assessors (1883) 35 La. Ann. 65; Na-
tional Surety Co. v. Stavkey (1919) 41 S. Dak. 356, 170 N. W. 582.
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tion.5 5 Though there is no express contract of exemption, an
attempt of a state or municipality to tax its bonds and deduct
the amount before payment of the interest to the holder violates
the contract clause.56
An express provision for exemption of bonds from taxation
does not necessarily establish an agreement or assent on the
part of the state to a contractual exemption. Such provision
might be regarded as only an expression of legislative policy and
not an intention to contract. 7 A provision in a constitution or
statute granting in general terms an exemption with regard to
all bonds issued by the state might well be so construed, espe-
cially if no reference were made on the face of the bond itself
to the exemption. Thus viewed, such a provision could be re-
pealed by the legislature at will, as there would be no contract. 8
A provision of a state constitution or statute may not amount
to a contract protected by the contract clause because the essen-
tial element of consideration is lacking, e. g., if the exemption is a
mere gratuity. An exception statute enacted after bonds had
been issued would very likely be held to amount to a mere gra-
tuitious exemption.59 Thus far the Supreme Court has refused
to work a contract out of a mere gratuitious exemption in other
connections. 60 There would seem to be no valid reason for not
applying the same rule to exemptions with regard to bonds.
However the courts' desire to place and keep the states' credit
upon a high plane6' might lead them to work out a contract where
state bonds are involved, whereas under similar circumstances
in other connections they might hold the exemption a mere gra-
tuity, supervening policy considerations inclining them more
55. State National Bank v. City of Memphis (1906) 116 Tenn. 641, 94
S. W. 606, 8 Ann. Cas. 22.
56. Murray v. City Council of Charles (1878) 96 U. S. 432, 24 L. ed. 760.
57. See Hale v. Iowa State Board of Assessment and Review (1937)
302 U. S. (adv. op.) 95, 100, 58 S. Ct. 102, 82 L. ed. 66. Cf. Wisconsin
and Michigan Ry. v. Powers (1903) 191 U. S. 379, 386, 24 S. Ct. 107, 48
L. ed. 229.
58. Wisconsin and Michigan Ry. Co. v. Powers (1903) 191 U. S. 379, 24
S. Ct. 107, 48 L. ed. 229.
59. Cf. Tucker v. Ferguson (1875) 22 Wall. 527, 22 L. ed. 805; Hall Col-
lege v. South Orange (1916) 242 U. S. 100, 37 St. Ct. 54, 61 L. ed. 170
(grant of exemption to corporation after charter had been issued and ac-
cepted held to be a mere gratuity).
60. Christ Church v. Philadelphia (1861) 24 How. 300, 16 L. ed. 602;
Welch v. Cook (1879) 97 U. S. 541, 22 L. ed. 805.
61. Cf. language of Strong, J., in Murray v. Charleston (1878) 96 U. S.
432, 449, 24 L. ed. 760; 96 U. S. 449; see also Mr. Justice Sutherland's dis-
sent in Pacific Co. v. Johnson (1932) 285 U. S. 480, 501, 52 S. Ct. 424, 76
L. ed. 883.
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readily to work out a legal obligation from what they considered
a moral obligation.
Again, the state constitution may prohibit the legislature from
making the alleged contract. In Missouri, for instance, the con-
stitution contains a list of poperty which shall be exempt from
taxation62 without mention of state bonds and, by a further
provision, makes all other exemptions void.63 The Attorney-Gen-
eral of Missouri has declared that any attempt of the legislature
to exempt state bonds from taxation would be unconstitutional
under these provisions.64 Should the courts follow this view,
no contract of exemption protected by the Federal Constitution
could exist with regard to Missouri bonds.65 But the Supreme
Court may determine for itself whether the legislature is em-
powered under the state constitution to grant the claimed exemp-
tion in the form of a contract.66
Where the exemption is statutory, the additional question of
the effect of a general provision in force when the bonds were
issued and the exemption granted and giving the legislature
power to repeal or amend all statutes may be presented. Inser-
tion in corporate charters or general statutes of a provision
reserving to the state the power to repeal or amend 7 has been
one of the most effective means employed to avoid the result
of the Dartmouth College Case. 8 The Supreme Court has held
that a general statute making all statutes subject to amendment
or repeal unless a contrary intent was plainly expressed therein
62. Mo. Const., art. X, see. 6.
63. Mo. Const., art. X, see. 7.
64. Opinion of the Attorney General, June 31, 1933, Prentice-Hall Mo.
Tax Service, sec. 31405. The Tennessee Supreme Court said that under
similar constitutional provisions, any attempted exemption of Tennessee
bonds would be invalid. State National Bank v. City of Memphis (1906)
116 Tenn. 641, 94 S. W. 606, 8 Ann. Cas. 22.
65. See Taylor v. Thomas (1875) 22 Wall. 479, 22 L. ed. 789; New York
ex rel. Gallantin National Bank v. Commissioners of Taxes and Assess-
ments (1877) 94 U. S. 415, 24 L. ed. 164; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Min-
nesota ex rel. Duluth (1908) 208 U. S. 583, 28 S. Ct. 341, 52 L. ed. 360.
66. Northwestern University v. Illinois (1879) 99 U. S. 309, 25 L. ed.
387; Louisville and Nashville Ry. v. Palmer (1883) 109 U. S. 244, 3 S. Ct.
193, 27 L. ed. 922.
67. The Pennsylvania College Cases (1872) 13 Wall. 190, 20 L. ed. 550;
Miller v. New York (1873) 15 Wall. 478, 21 L. ed. 98; Missouri Pacific
Ry. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Taylor (1909) 216 U. S. 262, 30 S. Ct. 330, 54
L. ed. 472. The states' reserved power to alter or repeal may not, how-
ever, be employed to destroy or impair any vested right. Although the con-
tract clause would not apply in such situation, the Fourteenth Amendment
would. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins (1936) 297 U. S. 629, 56 S. Ct.
611, 80 L. ed. 943.
68. (1819) 4 Wheat. 518, 4 L. ed. 629.
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prevented a provision contained in a corporate charter, that
property of the corporation should be forever free from taxation,
from becoming a contract within the meaning of the constitu-
tion.6' The effect, if any, of special policy considerations, such
as the upholding of the states' credit,70 involved where the state
bonds rather than corporate charters are concerned is of course
conjectural. There is, however, a more than remote possibility
that the court might be induced to take a different view. While
an exemption provision on the face of the bond itself would prob-
ably not be affected by such a general repeal provision, a nice
question might arise if both the exemption provision and refer-
ence to the general repeal statute appeared on the face of the
bond. A claimed exemption contract based only upon a provision
in a general exemption statute might, even if the court should
regard such a provision as contractual,71 be deemed subject to
the general repeal statute.
At one time, the question whether a suit to enforce the exemp-
tion after it had been abrogated was not a suit against a state,
so that under the Eleventh Amendment the judicial power of
the United States did not extend to cover the matter,7 2 might
have proved troublesome. It is now familiar law, however, that
a suit against a state official attempting to act under an uncon-
stitutional law is not a suit against the state.73
Thus far no case of attempted total abrogation by a state of
the tax-exemption expressed in its bonds has been presented.
Instead the question principally litigated has been whether some
particular form of taxation when applied to tax-exempt bonds
violates the contract into which the state has entered. To present
69. Covington v. Kentucky (1899) 173 U. S. 231, 19 S. Ct. 383, 43 L. ed.
678; see also Tomlinson v. Jessup (1873) 15 Wall. 454, 21 L. ed. 204; Citi-
zens National Bank v. Kentucky (1910) 217 U. S. 443, 30 S. Ct. 530, 54
L. ed. 832.
70. Supra, note 61.
71. Cf. cases cited supra, note 57.
72. This problem caused a great deal of trouble to the Court in the Vir-
ginia Tax Cases. Antoni v. Greenhow (1883) 107 U. S. 769, 2 S. Ct. 91, 27
L. ed. 468; Poindexter v. Greenhow (1885) 114 U. S. 270, 5 S. Ct. 903, 29
L. ed. 185; Allen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. (1885) 114 U. S. 311, 5 S. Ct.
925, 29 L. ed. 200; dissenting opinion at 114 U. S. 330, 5 S. Ct. 962, 29 L. ed.
207. These cases involved attempts on the part of bondholders to force the
state to accept coupons from its bonds in payment of taxes as the state
had contracted to do. The right to maintain such actions was upheld, al-
though there were strong dissents to the effect that the suit was one in
reality against the state itself of which the federal courts could not take
jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment.
73. See cases supra, note 72; Ex parte Young (1908) 209 U. S. 123, 28
S. Ct. 441, 52 L. ed. 714.
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a question under the Federal Constitution, the law imposing
the contested levy must have been enacted subsequent to the
contract of exemption; for if the levy is attempted under a pre-
existing statute, there has been no law passed after the contract
which impairs its obligation.74
The decisions of the Supreme Court construing exemptions in
state and municipal bonds have followed somewhat the same
general lines as those construing exemptions in corporate char-
ters. Although the court has been somewhat more prone to
uphold exemptions in bonds,7 5 still the dislike of contractual
exemption from taxation reflected in the doctrine of strict con-
struction is found in both classes of cases.7 6 In the corporate
charter cases that doctrine has been most frequently applied in
determining what property was within the exception. 7 The bond
cases raise no question as to what property is involved. The
question is usually whether the particular form of taxation ip
included in the exemption-a question which has also arisen in
the charter exemption cases.78 When an exemption is in general
terms, for example, "All bonds by this state or by any munici-
pality within the state shall be exempt from taxation," the rule
of strict construction has been applied by the Supreme Court to
exclude from the operation of the exemption any tax which does
not fall directly upon the bonds. So, in determining the value
of the estate for purposes of the state succession tax, inclusion
of the value of state bonds exempt under such a provision, found
among the property belonging to decedent, has been held not
to violate the contract clause.79 Relying upon a previous holding
that a state might, in levying a succession tax, include federal
bonds owned by a decedent in determining the value of his
estate,80 the court reasoned that the tax was not upon property
but upon the privilege of passing property after death.
74. Cf. St. Paul, etc. R. Co. v. Todd Co. (1892) 142 U. S. 282, 12 S. Ct.
281, 35 L. ed. 1014; Munday v. Wisconsin Trust Co. (1920) 252 U. S. 499,
40 S. Ct. 365, 64 L. ed. 684.
75. See note 61, supra.
76. See Hale v. Iowa State Board of Assessment & Review (1937) 302
U. S. (adv. op.) 95, 58 S. Ct. (adv. op.) 102, 82 L. ed. (adv. op.) 66; Jeffer-
son Branch Bank v. Skelly (1862) 1 Black 436, 17 L. ed. 173; The Provi-
dence Bank v. Billings (1830) 4 Pet. 514, 7 L. ed. 939.
77. See Jetton v. University of the South (1908) 208 U. S. 489, 28 S. Ct.
375, 52 L. ed. 584; Ford v. Delta & Pine Land Co. (1897) 164 U. S. 662,
17 S. Ct. 230, 41 L. ed. 590; Baker Judicial Interpretation of Tax Exemp-
tion Statutes (1929) 7 Tex. L. Rev. 385.
78. See St. Louis v. United Railways Co. (1908) 210 U. S. 266, 28 S. Ct.
630, 52 L. ed. 1054.
79. Orr v. Gilman (1902) 183 U. S. 278, 22 S. Ct. 213, 46 L. ed. 196.
80. Plummer v. Coler (1900) 178 U. S. 115, 20 S. Ct. 829, 44 L. ed. 749;
see Greiner v. Lewellyn (1922) 258 U. S. 384, 42 S. Ct. 324, 66 L. ed. 676 for
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That the power of the federal government to levy upon the
state bonds in question is not determinative of whether the tax
levied by the state violates the exemption contract is made clear
by Hale v. Iowa State Board of Assessment and Review.81 There
the court held that a state income tax levied upon interest from
bonds issued under general and specific tax-exemption statutes
did not impair the exemption contract. Mr. Justice Cardozo,
speaking for the Court, accepted the state court's view that an
income tax was not in its nature a property tax and held that,
by virtue of the rule of strict construction, the tax was not in-
cluded in the exemption. The federal government could clearly
not have levied upon the income from the bonds in question ;82
but Cardozo declared that the court was concerned only with
the effect and meaning of a particular contract of exemption
"to be read narrowly and strictly. There is no room at such a
time for the freer and broader methods that have been thought
to be appropriate in the development of the doctrine of implied
[intergovernmental] restraints.83 Justices Sutherland, McRey-
nolds, and Butler, dissenting on the ground that the exemption
contract included all taxes,84 seem to have had in mind the test
of whether the subsequent law causes a diminution in value of
the contract-a test sometimes applied in determining whether
the contract clause has been violated,8' but one not particularly
helpful in a case like this.
Two other cases involving the question of what taxes are in-
cluded in the exemption contract interestingly illustrate how
decisions change with the court's personnel. McCallen v. Massa
chusetts- involved a statute levying a purported franchise tax,
measured by the net income of domestic corporations. By the
statutory definition income from United States securities and
from state and municipal tax-exempt bonds was to be included
in computing net income. The prior superseded statute did not
include such income. The majority of the court, composed of
a similar holding as to inclusion of state bonds for purposes of federal
estate tax.
81. (1937) 302 U. S. (adv. op.) 95, 58 S. Ct. (adv. op.) 102, 82 L. ed.
(adv. op.) 66.
82. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (1895) 157 U. S. 429, 584, 15
S. Ct. 673, 39 L. ed. 759; National Life Insurance Co. v. United States(1928) 277 U. S. 508, 48 S. Ct. 591, 72 L. ed. 968.
83. (1937) 302 U. S. (adv. op.) 95, 109, 58 S. Ct. (adv. op.) 102, 82 L. ed.(adv. op.) 66.
84. (1937) 302 U. S. (adv. op.) 95, 110, 58 S. Ct. (adv. op.) 102, 82 L. ed.
(adv. op.) 66.
85. See Bank of Mississippi v. Sharp (1848) 6 How. 301, 12 L. ed. 447.
86. (1929) 279 U. S. 620, 49 S. Ct. 432, 73 L. ed. 874, 65 A. L. R. 866.
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Mr. Chief Justice Taft and Justices Sutherland, VanDevanter,
McReynolds, Butler, and Sanford, held that the tax, although in
name an excise tax, was in reality a tax directly upon the bonds.
It was therefore invalid as applied to the United States bonds
because of the implied intergovernmental exemption and as
applied to the state bonds because it impaired the obligation of
contracts. The court relied rather heavily upon the non-inclusion
of such income in the former tax statute, which fact, together
with the reports of the legislative committee, was taken to indi-
cate that the change of policy had been adopted for the purpose
of subjecting the securities pro tanto to the burden of the tax.87
The majority opinion mainly discussed the nature of the tax as
affecting the federal securities and summarily concluded that the
tax was contrary to the contract contained in the state bonds.88
That conclusion, as the Hale case89 remarked, was not demanded
by the holding that the tax as applied to the United States bonds
was invalid. Justices Stone, Holmes, and Brandeis, dissenting,
viewed the tax as simply an excise tax which might be measured
by the entire net income of the corporation, including that from
the bonds, federal and state.90
Three years later Pacific Company v. Johnson91 came before
the Court. It involved a California statute levying a franchise
tax upon corporations, measured by net income, which expressly
included income from federal, state, and municipal bonds. State
and municipal securities were exempt from taxation by the state
constitution. The statute was attacked on the grounds that it
violated the contract clause. The Supreme Court held that the
tax was an excise tax, not a tax directly upon the bonds. Under
the rule of strict construction the tax did not fall within the
contractual exemption. The majority was composed of Justices
Stone and Brandeis, who had dissented in the McCallen case, 2
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Roberts and Cardozo,
who were not on the court at the time it was decided, and Mr.
Justice McReynolds, who had been of the majority. Justices
Sutherland, VanDevanter and Butler, who were among the ma-
jority in the McCallen case, dissented, 93 largely upon the author-
87. See 279 U. S. at 631.
88. See 279 U. S. at 634.
89. Hale v. Iowa St. Bd. of Assessment and Review (1937) 302 U. S.(adv. op.) 95, 58 S. Ct. (adv. op.) 102, 82 L. ed. (adv. op.) 66.
90. See 279 U. S. at 684.
91. (1932) 285 U. S. 480, 52 S. Ct. 424, 76 L. ed. 893.
92. (1929) 279 U. S. 620, 49 S. Ct. 432, 73 L. ed. 874, 65 A. L. R. 866.
93. See 285 U. S. at 456.
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ity of that case, but also in reliance, as in the McCallen case,".1
upon legislative committee reports suggesting that the state was
attempting to reach in some manner the exempt bonds. 5 The
majority, however, viewed the operation of the tax rather than
the motive which inspired it as the imnportant factor in the
determination of its validity.96
The problem of construction involved in determining what
taxes are included in the contract may of course be simplified by
a statutory enumeration of the taxes to which the exemption
shall apply. The doctrine against implied exemptions from taxa-
tion would then restrict the exemption to the taxes enumerated.07
But if the exemption by its terms applied to all except certain
specified taxes, e. g., estate taxes, the doctrine of expressio unius
est exelusio alterius, usually employed in the construction of
statutes and contracts, might conceivably not be applied. 98
II
Since the contract clause does not apply to federal statutes,",
the constitutional problems which would be involved in an
attempt of Congress to abrogate tax-exemption clauses in federal
securities 10 would arise under a different provision of the Con-
94. See 279 U. S. at 633.
95. See 285 U. S. at 498.
96. See 285 U. S. at 496.
97. See cases cited in notes 77 and 78, supra.
98. See Phipps v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1937) 91 F. (2d)
627; cert. denied, (1937) 302 U. S. (adv. op.) xxvi (No. 464), 58 S. Ct. 144,
82 L. ed. (adv. op.) 105. Hamersley v. United States (1936) 16 Fed. Supp.
768; cert. denied (1937) 300 U. S. 659, 57 S. Ct. 435, 81 L. ed. 868.
99. Art. 10, Sec. 1 in terms applies to the states only. A motion made
in the Constitutional Convention to put Congress under the same prohibition
as the states with regard to contracts was not seconded. 2 Farrand, op. cit.
supra, note 24 at 619. See New York v. United States (1922) 257 U. S.
591, 42 S. Ct. 239, 66 L. ed. 385.
100. The following United States securities are exempt, either wholly or
in part, from federal taxation. Panama Canal Bonds (1909) 36 Stat. 117,
(1927) 31 U. S. C. A. sec. 745; Postal Savings Bonds (1910) 36 Stat. 817,
(1928) 39 U. S. C. A. sec. 760; Conversion Bonds (1913) 38 Stat. 269;
Liberty Loan Bonds (1917) 40 Stat. 35, (1927) 31 U. S. C. A. sec. 746;
(1917) 40 Stat. 291, (1927) 31 U. S. C. A. sec. 747; (1924) 43 Stat. 349,
(1927) 31 U. S. C. A. sec. 748; (1926) 44 Stat. 122, (1927) 31 U. S. C. A.
sec. 748 (a) ; Adjusted Service Bonds (1926) 49 Stat. 1101, (1928) 38 U. S.
C. A. sec. 686 (c) (under Second Liberty Loan Act (1917) 40 Stat. 291,
(1927) 31 U. S. C. A. sec. 747); Treasury Notes issued under Second
Liberty Loan Act, supra; Treasury Bills and certificates issued under Sec-
ond Liberty Loan Act (supra) (1929) 46 Stat. 19, (1927) 31 U. S. C. A.
sec. 754; (1930) 46 Stat. 775, (1927) 31 U. S. C. A. sec. 754; Federal Farm
Mortgage Corporation Bonds (1934) 48 Stat. 347, (1936) 12 U. S. C. A.
sec. 1020f; (1934) 48 Stat. 360;Home Owners' Loan Corporation Bonds
(1933) 48 Stat. 129, (1936) 12 U. S. C. A. sec. 1463 (c); obligations
of Federal Home Loan Bank (1932) 47 Stat. 735, (1936) 12 U. S. C. A.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol23/iss4/12
stitution. The problems would, however, be somewhat similar
to those arising under a state statute affecting state bonds. The
validity of the congressional action would depend upon the "due
process" clause of the Fifth Amendment, which prevents, within
limits, action by Congress which divests vested rights. 0' Vested
rights so protected may arise under either private contracts or
contracts with the United States.10 2 The scope of its prohibition
as to vested rights founded upon a contract is narrower than
that of the contract clause as to state action affecting vested
rights founded upon a contract.
The Fifth Amendment is by no means an absolute bar to con-
gressional action impairing contractual obligations. That Con-
gress may in the proper exercise of a governmental function
pass a law which destroys or prevents the enforcement of pri-
vate contracts is now fairly well established, although the ques-
tion has occasioned much controversy. 0 3 What a proper exer-
cise of a governmental function is has never been exactly defined.
Apparently the matter is to be determined upon the particular
facts of each case.' 0 ' Due process is a much more flexible con-
cept than the prohibition contained in the contract clause, and
thus is likely to present a much less formidable obstacle to a
favorable court than the contract clause.
In Lynck v. United States, Mr. Justice Brandeis said that
the Fifth Amendment prevents congressional action which an-
nuls contracts of the United States unless "the action taken falls
within the federal police power or some other paramount
power."' -5 As with private contracts, the content of the phrase,
"other paramount power," is undecided. The Gold Clause cases 06
indicate that congressional action which affects contracts be-
tween private parties and contracts with the United States may
be valid as to the former and invalid as to the latter. There
1433; obligations of Reconstruction Finance Corporation (1932) 47 Stat. 9,
(1927) 15 U. S. C. A. 610; obligations of Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (1932) 49 Stat. 700, (1936) 12 U. S. C. A. sec. 264p.; obligations of
United States Housing Authority (1937) 50 Stat. 898, (1928) 42 U. S. C. A.
1420.
101. See Lynch v. United States (1934) 292 U. S. 571, 579, 54 S. Ct.
840, 78 L. ed. 1434.
102. See the Sinking Fund Cases (1879) 99 U. S. 700, 25 L. ed. 496;
(1886) 118 U. S. 235, 6 S. Ct. 1038, 30 L. ed. 173; Hepburn v. Giswold
(1870) 8 Wall. 603, 19 L. ed. 513; The Legal Tender Cases (1871) 12 Wall.
457, 20 L. ed. 287; The Gold Clause Cases (1934) 294 U. S. 240, 55 S. Ct.
407, 79 L. ed. 885; 294 U. S. 330, 55 S. Ct. 432, 79 L. ed. 912.
103. The Legal Tender Cases, The Sinking Fund Cases, and The Gold
Clause Cases, all cited supra, note 102.
104. Ibid.
105. (1934) 292 U. S. 571, 579, 54 S. Ct. 840; 78 L. ed. 1434.
106. See cases cited supra, note 102.
19381 NOTES
Washington University Open Scholarship
524 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23
have been suggestions that Congress may not under any guise
alter contracts entered into by the United States. Hamilton said
that the promises of a government "may be justly considered as
excepted out of its power to legislate, unless in aid of them" ;101
and this view has been advanced by individual members of the
Supreme Court but never accepted by the court as a whole.10 8
Choate v. TrappW °0 held that a vested right in a tax exemption
may arise under a contract with the United States. Congress
had provided that land owned by Indian tribes and theretofore
held in common should be divided among the members. The
share of each allottee should remain untaxable in his hands for
twenty-one years. Certain restrictions were imposed upon alien-
ation. Acceptance by an Indian of a patent to his share was to
operate as an assent on his part to the allotment of all the land
of the tribe in accordance with the provisions of the act and as
a relinquishment of his interest in other parts of the community
proper. After the patents issued and before the expiration of
twenty-one years, a statute was passed by Congress removing
from certain lands the restrictions upon alienation and further
providing that such land should thereafter be subject to taxation.
Oklahoma undertook to tax the land. The Supreme Court held
that the act of Congress constituted an offer by the United States,
which, when accepted by each member by receipt of his patent,
ripened into a contract. Relinquishment of the member's claim
to the other land was held to be sufficient consideration to sup-
port the contract. The exemption from taxation was held to be
a property right vested by virtue of the contract and protected
from repeal by the Fifth Amendment.
If the broad proposition of this case, that an exemption from
taxation founded upon a contract with the United States is a
vested property right protected by the Fifth Amendment, were
followed, the problem as to tax-exempt provisions in United
States bonds would be primarily whether the exemption was
based upon a contract. If so, it would be protected against repeal
except in the exercise of some "paramount power." 1 0 However,
several reasons suggest themselves for restricting the case to its
specific facts and for not following it as to exemptions in United
107. 3 Hamilton, Works (1904) 518.
108. Hepburn v. Griswold (1870) 8 Wall. 603, 623, 19 L. ed. 513; Mr. Jus-
tice Strong's dissent in Sinking Fund Cases (1879) 99 U. S. 700, 731, 25
L. ed. 496.
109. (1912) 224 U. S. 665, 32 S. Ct. 565, 56 L. ed. 941.
110. Lynch v. United States (1934) 292 U. S. 571, 54 S. Ct. 840, 78 L. ed.
1434.
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States bonds. First, Ch-oate v. Trapp"' involved a contract with
Indians, and such contracts have been regarded as in a some-
what special category.12 Second, no attempt to exercise the
taxing power of the United States was in question, but rather
the attempt of a state to exercise its power. The contract pre-
vented a tax on the land. Such a contract could have little effect
upon the taxing power of the United States. Not only has Con-
gress never attempted to levy a land tax, but such a tax, being
a direct tax, under the Constitution would have to be appor-
tioned. 13 On the other hand, a tax exemption in United States
bond would seriously affect the national taxing power; for such
exemptions extend to the interest as well as the principal," 4 and
the interest in the absence of the exemption would be subject to
the income tax-the Federal Government's largest single source
of revenue. 1115 However, the fact that the borrowing power was
involved would probably have more weight with the court than
all other factors in determining whether there was a vested
right involved. The Court's desire to enforce promises made in
connection with the borrowing power would tend strongly to
lead it to regard the exemption as a vested right.
The arguments advanced against the existence of state power
to contract for non-exercise of the power of taxation might be
urged against the proposition that a vested right to an exemp-
tion may be acquired under a contract with the United States.
Whether it would be more favorably received than have the
objections raised with regard to state contracts is doubtful.
Any exemption from taxation to constitute a vested right
would probably have to be based upon a contract as distinguished
from a more gratuitous exemption. However, it would appear
to be easy to derive contracts from the exemption clauses in
federal bonds and securities, as such provisions are contained
in the statutes under which the various obligations are issued"8
and also on the face of the instruments.
Should the court conclude that the bondholder acquired a
vested right, the doctrine that Congress can abrogate vested
111. (1912) 224 U. S. 665, 32 S. Ct. 565, 56 L. ed. 941.
112. See Carpenter v. Shaw (1930) 280 U. S. 363, 50 S. Ct. 121, 74 L. ed.
478.
113. U. S. Const., Art. I, See. 2, cl. 3; Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 4.
114. See note 100, supra.
115. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1937, income taxes accounted
for $2,157,526,981. The total revenue of the federal government for the
period was $5,293,840,237. President's Budget Message, N. Y. Times, Jan. 6,
1938, p. 12: 6.
116. See note 100, supra.
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'rights" in the exercise of the police or some other paramount
pOwer 17 would probably seldom be applicable. Normally abro-
'ation of the exemption would involve an exercise, not of the
police, but of the taxing power. There would be little reason for
holding that a vested right in a contract of exemption from tax-
"dtion could be acquired but that such right might be divested
through exercise of the power of taxation.- Possibly under cer-
tain circumstances, abrogation might be justified as an exercise
of some power other than that of taxation, for example, the war
power. The war power, if available as a basis for such action,
Would probably be a "paramount power" within Mr. Justice
Brandeis' statement.118
Since Congress has never attempted to repudiate the exemp-
tion clauses in United States bonds, the Supreme Court has not
been called upon to determine how far it might go in the mat-
ter."9 The problem thus far has been altogether one of con-
struction. As to exemption clauses in federal bonds, the courts
have applied the rule of strict construction. Thus the Supreme
Court has held that tax-exempt United States bonds should be
included in valuing decedents' estates for the purpse of comput-
ing the federal estate tax.2 0 A provision exempting Liberty
Bonds from all taxation as to principal and interest except
estate and inheritance taxes does not include an exemption from
gift taxes, 21 which do not constitute a tax upon the bonds but
upon the privilege of transferring them by gift. The maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius has no application because
the bonds would be subject to estate and inheritance taxes in the
absence of any express provision to the contrary. Furthermore
income received in the form of tax-exempt Liberty Bonds is sub-
ject to taxation by the federal government. 2
ROBERT WELBORN.
117. Lynch v. United States, (1934) 292 U. S. 571, 54 S. Ct. 840, 78 L. ed.
1434.
118. Ibid.
119. Compare language of Mr. Justice Shiras in Murdock v. Ward (1900)
178 U. S. 139, 148, 20 S. Ct. 775, 44 L. ed. 1009 and that of Mr. Justice Mc-
Reynolds in National Life Insurance Co. v. United States (1928) 277 U. S.
508, 521, 48 S. Ct. 591, 72 L. ed. 969.
120. Murdock v. Wood, supra, note 119, Igleheart v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (1935) 77 F. (2d) 706.
121. Phipps v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1937) 91 F. (2d) 627;
cert. denied (1937) 302 U. S. (adv. op.) xxvi, 58 S. Ct. (adv. op.) 144, 82
L. ed. (adv. op.) 105; Hamersley v. United States (1936) 16 Fed. Supp. 768;
cert. denied, (1937) 300 U. S. 659, 57 S. Ct. 435, 81 L. ed. 868.
122. District of Columbia v. Riggs National Bank (1929) 30 F. (2d) 873.
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